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Abstract
This paper analyzes the distribution of discretionary transfers from higher tiers
of government in the process of fiscal adjustment in local jurisdictions which were
hit by a negative revenue shock in formula transfers. Spanish local governments
experienced a 30% fall in their revenue-sharing revenues at the beginning of the
Great Recession. We use a ‘difference-in-discontinuities’ design to identify the
causal effect of that shock on the amount of discretionary grants provided by three
higher tiers of government (i.e., central, regional, and provincial) and on other bud-
get items (i.e., spending and taxation). We identify these effects using an exoge-
nous variation in formula transfers, as the losses during the crisis of municipalities
above the 5,000 population threshold were greater than the losses of those below
this threshold. We find that, on average, municipalities above and below the 5,000
inhabitant threshold did not differentially adjust their budgets during the crisis.
Rather, we find that for the most indebted municipalities, a substantial share of the
shock was absorbed by discretionary grants provided by regional and provincial
governments.
Keywords: intergovernmental transfers; bailouts; fiscal consolidation
JEL Classification: E62, H72, R5
* corresponding author, email: foremny@ub.edu
† email: asole@ub.edu.
We are grateful to the comments by Friedrich Heinemann, Thomas Stratmann and Zareh Asatryan. This
paper presents first results of still on-going research which has received funding from the Project SEEK-2014,
‘Fiscal governance and adjustment under crisis conditions’, ZEW, Mannheim. We also acknowledge the support
of projects ECO2012-37131 (Ministerio de Educaciòn y Ciencia) and 2009SGR102 (Generalitat de Catalunya).
1 Introduction
Local governments across the globe experienced high levels of fiscal stress during the last reces-
sion (Ter-Minassian and Fedelino, 2010). The causes of these fiscal imbalances were twofold.
First, many local governments had to deal with a reduction in their own-source revenues, based
as they were on taxes (most notably, property transactions, capital gains, and business taxes)
that fell sharply during the crisis. However, much of the problem was caused by the reduction in
transfers originating from the upper tiers of government (Martínez-Vázquez and Searle, 2007).
While this state of affairs was not entirely surprising, it does run contrary to the stabilizing role
that these transfers are in theory supposed to play (see Blöchliger and Petzold, 2009). Indeed,
transfers should be used to reduce the procyclicality of tax revenues and local spending; that is,
they should be less generous in good times and more generous in bad times, especially when
local tax autonomy is limited, and local governments face borrowing constraints (von Hagen,
2008).
One of the reasons why this does not occur in practice is that, in many countries, the evo-
lution of transfers is directly linked to the evolution of the central government’s tax revenues
(OECD, 2014).1 As central tax revenues tend to move with the cycle, spending on transfers also
becomes procyclical and can exacerbate local government own-revenue fluctuations. This, for
instance, has been the case of the revenue-sharing transfer received by the Spanish municipal-
ities, whose dramatic fall during the Great Recession is analyzed in this paper. On the other
hand, note that some intergovernmental transfers might be counter-cyclical.2 For instance,
and of particular relevance to our purpose here, discretionary transfers might be used during a
crisis to provide implicit bailouts to local governments in financial trouble (Rodden, Eskeland,
and Litvack, 2003; Vigneault, 2007). Although these transfers might provide some insurance
against shocks and, thus, help local governments stabilize their revenues and avoid procyclical
outcomes, bailouts might also give rise to moral hazard problems. Expectations of a bailout
might soften the local budget constraint (Kornai, 1979) and, so, provide strong incentives to in-
crease debt and to wait until higher tiers of government come to the rescue (see, e.g., Wildasin,
1997; Goodspeed, 2002; Köthenbürger, 2004; Breuillé and Vigneault, 2010, or Bordignon and
Turati, 2009).3 Note that the evolution of these two types of transfer might be interconnected:
1There are other reasons that account for the procylicality of transfers (see OECD, 2014, for a more detailed
analysis). For example, in times of crisis, local governments might find it difficult to fulfill the matching require-
ments of some grants. Also, the procyclicality of transfers might be policy-driven, as the central government might
have incentives to increase transfers during booms (Abbott and Jones, 2012 and Abbott and Jones, 2013) and to
reduce them during a crisis (Ahrend, Curto-Grau, and Vammalle, 2013).
2Another factor contributing to the counter-cyclicality of transfers is that specific grants - those mostly ear-
marked for capital projects - tend to constitute an important ingredient of stimulus packages (see, e.g., Carlino
and Inman, 2015, for a discussion of the US case).
3Some papers though consider that bailouts may have some positive effects. For instance, without bailouts
sub-national governments might be reluctant to engage in risky but socially beneficial projects (see Besfamille
and Lockwood, 2008). Some recent papers also suggest that conditional bailouts (i.e., bailouts that impose a tight
adjustment plan in exchange for financial assistance) might actually help consolidate local budgets (Dietrichson
and Ellegård, 2015).
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that is, the procyclical behavior of revenue-sharing grants might have been responsible for the
rise in the number of bailout episodes during the crisis. This is a disappointing outcome from
a policy perspective, given that strengthening the link between local resources and tax collec-
tions is often advocated on the grounds of increasing fiscal responsibility (e.g., Weingast, 2009).
This paper analyzes the role of discretionary grants used as tools by higher tier governments
to bailout local governments when the latter face a revenue-sharing slump. We focus on Span-
ish local governments, which experienced a fall in their revenue-sharing revenues of more than
30% at the beginning of the Great Recession. We look at the effect of this negative shock on
the amount of discretionary grants received and on other budget outcomes (i.e., spending and
taxes) during the Great Recession (2008-2012). The first contribution made by this paper is to
provide evidence of implicit bailouts, that is, of higher tiers of government increasing grants
to local governments in the wake of a negative shock. The literature abounds with anecdotal
accounts of bailout episodes (see Rodden, Eskeland, and Litvack, 2003; Inman, 2001; Dahlberg
and von Hagen, 2004) and various papers provide econometric evidence of the positive effects
of debt on discretionary grant allocation (see Bordignon and Turati, 2009; Sorribas-Navarro,
2011; Fink and Stratmann, 2011).4 Moreover, while these papers examine bailouts by fed-
eral governments of state administrations, we focus our study on the role played by all higher
tiers of government (i.e., central, regional, provincial) in rescuing local governments that find
themselves in trouble. Indeed, our results provide evidence of the differences in the bailout
incentives of these three higher tiers of government. These differences would appear to be at-
tributable to the role played by each tier in the design and implementation of revenue-sharing
grants5, to the overlap that exists between upper tiers and local governments in the funding
of specific services6, and to the political role played by local governments vis-à-vis each upper
tier.7 To the best of our knowledge, only a few papers take into account the possibility that more
than one tier of government might be granting or receiving bailouts (see Breuillé and Vigneault,
2010, for one obvious exception).
Our second contribution is to use a quasi-experimental methodology that allows us to in-
terpret our results as causal. We implement a ‘difference-in-discontinuities’ design (see Nan-
nicini, Grembi, and Troiano, 2016), which specifically exploits the characteristics of a 2002 re-
4Other papers have sought to identify the effect of bailout expectations on spending and deficit decisions, in
an effort to provide evidence of a soft-budget constraint and, hence, of moral hazard problems (see Pettersson-
Lidbom, 2010; Bordignon and Turati, 2009). Given the enormous difficulties in the measurement of expectations,
we have opted not to pursue this approach and so we make no claims to be testing for the presence of a soft budget
constraint. Rather, our study examines the causal effect of the shock on discretionary grants.
5For instance, in Spain the central government is responsible for the design of local revenue-sharing. Interest-
ingly, a reform enacted by this tier of government in 2004 exposed this transfer revenue completely to the evolution
of the business cycle. Recently, central government has been blamed for the poor outcomes, which might have
affected its bailout incentives.
6Regional and provincial governments tend to co-fund many local services and projects, which means they
might be especially concerned for these specific outcomes.
7There is evidence that regional and provincial governments - much more than is the case of central govern-
ment - tend to favor co-partisan discrimination in the allocation of local transfers (see Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-
Navarro, 2008).
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form of the local revenue-sharing transfer system that generated larger relative revenue losses
during the 2008-2013 crisis for municipalities with a population threshold above that of 5,000
inhabitants. Various authors have already stressed the omitted-variable and endogeneity prob-
lems that plague the estimation of the effects of intergovernmental transfers (e.g., Knight, 2002)
and, indeed, several studies employ quasi-experimental methods for precisely this purpose
(see Gordon, 2004; Dahlberg et al., 2008; Lundqvist, Dahlberg, and Mörk, 2014; Litschig and
Morrison, 2013). In some of these papers the identification strategy exploits the exogenous
variation created by a reform in the transfer formula (see Gordon, 2004 and Cascio, Gordon,
and Reber, 2013), others rely on a ‘regression discontinuity design’ that exploits jumps or kinks
at specific population thresholds (e.g., Dahlberg et al., 2008; Lundqvist, Dahlberg, and Mörk,
2014; and Litschig and Morrison, 2013). Our identification strategy in this papers combines the
advantages of these two approaches.
Similarly note that all the aforementioned studies examine the long-run effect of transfers
on budget outcomes and not the response to a negative shock over time. Several papers have,
however, analyzed the role that transfers play in the dynamics of local fiscal adjustment (Buet-
tner and Wildasin, 2006; Buettner, 2009; and Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro, 2012). Buettner
and Wildasin (2006) find that transfers have no impact on fiscal adjustment in the US, while
Buettner (2009) and Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro (2012) find that formula transfers do have
an effect after tax base shocks in Germany and that capital transfers are adjusted in the wake of
an expenditure shock in Spain, respectively. Note, however, that these papers do not differenti-
ate between positive and negative shocks and given that the response need not be symmetric,
these findings might not actually reveal a great deal about the role of transfers during a crisis.
Likewise, these papers rely on VAR methods to identify these effects, and while they provide a
very rich description of the dynamic of the response to the shock, they have well-documented
limitations in terms of identification. As such, our quasi-experimental approach constitutes an
improvement on such methods.
We find that municipalities above and below the 5,000 inhabitant threshold did not differen-
tially adjust their spending or taxation levels during the crisis. These results indicate either the
complete failure to consolidate local budgets or the fact that higher tiers of government inter-
vened to remedy the situation. Both scenarios are supported by our results. First, on average,
municipalities simply allowed their debt levels to grow as they absorbed the shock. However,
in the case of the most heavily indebted municipalities, a substantial share of the shock was
absorbed by regional and provincial discretionary grants. Despite anecdotal evidence of the
central government adopting specific measures in response to the revenue-sharing slump, our
results suggest that it took no part in rescuing troubled municipalities. This would imply that
the bailout measures enacted by the central government were mainly just rhetoric or simply
ineffective. Indeed, our results indicate that most of the bailing out of local governments was
undertaken by the regional governments and, to a lesser extent, the provincial governments.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the background to
local public finances in Spain, outlining the revenue-sharing transfer systems and the effects
of the 2002 reform, which plays a crucial role in our identification strategy. In Section 3 we
devise a conceptual framework to aid us in the interpretation of our results and we describe the
identification strategy used and the data. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Institutional background
2.1 Spanish local public finances
Spain has four tiers of government. There are 17 regional governments (the so-called Comu-
nidades Autónomas), responsible for major spending categories, including health and educa-
tion. Below this, there are two tiers of local government: the provinces and the municipalities.
Contrary to the situation in most federal countries, local government is regulated and funded
by the central government (i.e., they are not the dependents of the regions). However, as the re-
gional governments delegate some of their spending responsibilities to the municipalities, they
do co-fund these services and so demonstrate a concern for their quality and for the financial
situation of the municipal governments. The role of the provinces is restricted to the provi-
sion of administrative and financial assistance to small municipalities, which suggests that the
provision of relief in times of crisis might be quite natural. Note also that, while regional and
municipal politicians are elected directly, provincial politicians are chosen indirectly based on
the results of the municipal elections. Spain has more than 8,000 municipalities, most of which
are small. The municipalities are multi-purpose governments with similar spending responsi-
bilities to those assigned to local governments elsewhere (i.e., environmental services, urban
planning, transportation and urban infrastructure, welfare assistance). However, the size of
Spanish local governments is comparatively modest (i.e., representing around 15% of public
spending).
Municipal own revenues account for around two thirds of current revenues8, and the re-
maining third are grants (see Solé-Ollé, 2010). The main grant is a revenue-sharing grant al-
located by the central government (i.e., the PIE, or Participaciòn en los Ingresos del Estado),
which normally accounts for two thirds of current grants. The remaining grants are earmarked
for specific purposes. To receive such grants, municipalities must respond to calls convened by
government agencies (belonging to one of the higher tiers of government, i.e., central, regional
or provincial). The tax-sharing grant is an unconditional formula grant and cannot therefore
be manipulated. Earmarked transfers are somewhat discretionary, and the rules applied for
their concession are not always clear (see Solé-Ollé, 2010). Some of these grants might be com-
8Two thirds of a municipality’s own revenues are derived from taxes, while the remaining third come from user
charges. The main taxes are the property tax, the local vehicle tax and the local business tax, which account for
50, 25 and 10%, respectively, of tax revenues. Spanish local governments can set the rates of these taxes, subject to
minimum and maximum rates that are rarely binding.
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pletely discretionary, given that their purpose is to address specific situations, such as catas-
trophes (e.g., floods, forest fires, etc.) or financial difficulties. During periods of crisis, regional
and local governments tend to create new financial relief grants or to change the regulations
applying to previous grants so that they might be used to fund deficits (i.e., by allowing capital
transfers to be used for current spending).
2.2 The revenue-sharing transfer
Amount and evolution. The grant was introduced in the late 1980s9 with the aim of providing
a stable framework for financing the Spanish municipalities, which had been exposed to
a period of severe funding problems at the beginning of that decade. The law extended
municipal tax autonomy (e.g., by widening the difference between minimum and maximum
tax rates) and converted the unconditional grant received by municipalities from the central
government into a revenue-sharing transfer. The law specified that the formula and overall
amount could be modified every fifth year, following negotiations between the municipalities
and the central government. During the negotiations, the central government typically raised
the amount to be distributed in the following period (to make the changes to the formula more
palatable for the municipalities). The amount of funding in this base year was expressed as a
percentage of the central government’s tax revenues and modified in the following period in
line with the growth in the tax revenue rate. Importantly, the law established both a floor and
a ceiling for the evolution in the overall amount of the grant: the amount to be distributed
was not permitted to grow more than the (nominal) growth rate of GDP and was to be kept
constant in real terms. 10
Allocation formula. The new law specified the variables to be included in the polynomial
formula used for allocation.11 These variables were weighted population (with weights
jumping at the 5, 20, 50 and 100 thousand population thresholds), tax effort (computed as
the ratio between the tax rates set by the municipality and the maximum tax rates allowed
by law), and the number of school units (since municipalities have some responsibilities for
maintaining state schools). Weighted population represented the variable with the greatest
weight (between 70 and 75%). School units were subsequently withdrawn from the formula,
on the grounds that school maintenance represented a small share of local spending, and the
weight of tax effort was reduced after 1999, given that it did little to stimulate tax autonomy.
Instead, an inverse fiscal capacity variable was introduced in the formula; note, that before
9The main traits of the tax-sharing grant (PIE) are outlined in the legislation that continues to regulate local
public finances in Spain, that is, Law 39/1988, Reguladora de Haciendas Locales,
10During the period 1990-1994 the floor was set by the growth rate of spending needs, quantified as the rate
of growth of central government spending in categories similar to those for which local government has respon-
sibility. The implementation of this rule gave too much discretionary power to central government and was aban-
doned following repeated complaints from the municipalities.
11See Solé-Ollé and Bosch (2005) and Solé-Ollé (2010), for a detailed description.
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1999, the unconditional grant failed to equalize the differences in the local tax bases. The way
in which this variable was computed during the period 1999-2003 was particularly blunt, to
the extent that the equalizing power of the formula remained null (see Solé-Ollé and Bosch,
2005). It was not until the 2002 reform that the calculation of this variable was improved and
the impact of this change is crucial for our identification strategy here (for more details see
below).
Minimum guaranteed transfer. The central government employed two main tools to
alleviate the distributional effects of the re-negotiation of the revenue-sharing grant. First,
it increased the amount of money for distribution. Second, it guaranteed that, in each of
the following five years, each municipality received at least the same amount of money (in
nominal terms) that it would have received if the old system had been applied at the outset.
This meant that, in practice, the new formula was never fully applied. The municipalities
that under the new formula received an amount that was lower than the sum received under
the old formula were granted a minimum guaranteed transfer equal to the amount of the
old formula. The discrepancies between the formula and the minimum grant were then
subtracted from the formula grant of those municipalities unaffected by the constraint (i.e.,
those for which the new formula amount was larger than the minimum guaranteed transfer).
Since the minimum only applied to the first year of the period, the number of municipalities
receiving the minimum transfer fell (and eventually disappeared completely) during periods
when the total amount of the grant to be distributed grew. Of course, this share might increase
over time as this amount shrank, and over a long period it might fluctuate in line with the
business cycle. Third, an additional guarantee was provided for small municipalities (those
below the 5,000 threshold), which meant that the application of the formula for municipalities
with particularly low values of the variables was further limited.
Implementation. The purpose of the revenue-sharing grant is to provide a stable source of
cash for all municipalities. Therefore, a system of ‘cash-advances’ was used: the central govern-
ment disbursed an estimation of the yearly grant to each municipality in monthly installments.
This estimate was based on the information in t-1 of the variables included in the formula and
on a forecast made in t-1 of the evolution in central government’s tax revenues (included in the
budget law of year t). The grant was then rectified during the second semester of t+2, once the
final data regarding the formula variables and tax revenue were known. A municipality received
an additional grant in t+2 if the ‘cash-advance’ was lower than the final amount of the grant. If
this final amount was higher than the ‘cash-advance’ then the municipality had to return the
difference to the central government. Originally, it was established that municipalities had to
refund these negative grants in monthly quotas over a two-year period.
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2.3 The 2002 reform
The revenue-sharing grant was reformed in 2002, and the new system came into effect at the
start of 2004.12 The reform introduced two main changes:
• First, the evolution of the overall grant amount would be linked to the growth in the cen-
tral government’s tax revenues. Thus, the GDP ceiling and the price floor were abolished.
Similarly, the scheduled reforms that occurred every fifth year were also abolished. As a
result, the municipalities were able to benefit from the extraordinary growth in revenue
during the boom years. However, they were at the same time completely exposed to the
fluctuations of the economic cycle.13 The main motivation for this reform was politi-
cal: the central incumbent could not resist the rent-seeking pressures from local (and
regional) governments in the face of the huge revenue windfalls of that period.14
• Second, changes were made to the formula and the minimum grant. The weight at
the 5,000 inhabitant threshold was raised from 1.15 to 1.17, and the jump at the 10,000
threshold (i.e., from 1.15 to 1.17) was abolished.15 The computation of the fiscal capac-
ity variable was also changed. Between 1999 and 2003, fiscal capacity was computed as
the average tax revenues per capita of the population bracket of the municipality. As
of 2004 fiscal capacity was computed using the tax revenues per capita of each particu-
lar municipality relative to the average fiscal capacity of the population bracket.16 Note,
the additional minimum grant for small municipalities (those below the 5,000 inhabitant
threshold) was abolished.
This reform had significant effects that we exploit for our identification strategy. First, the
reform increased the exposure of the revenue-sharing transfer to the economic cycle. Figure
1 shows the actual evolution of the revenue-sharing transfer (in per capita terms) during the
period 2002-2013 (blue line), and also the simulated evolution of the grant had the ceiling and
floor limits not been abolished by the 2002 reform (red line). The Great Recession started in
2008, hitting Spain a year later and cutting its GDP by 3.6%. The GDP growth rate was to remain
12Table A1 in the Appendix summarizes the changes implemented in the formula.
13Note that this reform needs to be seen as part of a wider one. Both the regions and the cities with a population
threshold above 75,000 were given access to tax sharing in specific taxes collected in their jurisdiction (namely,
personal income tax, VAT and excises).
14The incumbent’s view regarding decentralization probably also influenced the reform. The aim was to in-
crease fiscal responsibility by making sub-national revenues more sensitive to growth and by increasing sub-
national tax powers (this last change only being made for the regions, see Solé-Ollé, 2013). The purpose was
to rein in the supposed spending profligacy of sub-national governments and to harden budget constraints (see
Sorribas-Navarro, 2011).
15The jump at the 100,000 threshold also disappeared as following the reform municipalities above the 75,000
threshold were moved to a different funding system.
16Clearly, both approaches are erroneous. The first only redistributes between population brackets, such that
the equalization power remains null. The second redistributes within brackets, creating unusual effects at the
thresholds. The reasons for this peculiar design are the political difficulties encountered in attempting to equalize
fiscal capacity. The solution adopted in 1998 was entirely cynical: fiscal capacity was included in the formula,
but the eventual design rendered it impracticable. The situation began to change with the 2002 reform and the
availability of funds to compensate losers.
8
negative throughout the rest of this period. Figure 1 clearly illustrates the immense size of the
shock to revenue-sharing in 2008 and 2009. The drop represented a fall of around 30% on the
2007 level, with reductions of a similar size in both fiscal years. The average per capita amount
that was distributed shrank from more than 180 euros to less than 130. Note, however, that the
grant would not have fallen so much had the old evolution rule (based on price growth, which
was positive during the crisis years) been retained. Of course, similarly, the grant would not
have grown so much during the boom, given that central government’s tax revenues grew more
than national GDP during those years. Yet, even in the old system, the tax-sharing grant was
procyclical, with revenues growing at a higher rate than the trend GDP (dotted line).
[Figure 1 about here]
Second, the reform increased the difference between the amount of transfers assigned by the
formula to municipalities below and above the 5,000 threshold. Per capita grants had already
jumped at this threshold before the reform, because of the jump in the population weight ap-
plied. However, the aforementioned modifications in the formula heightened the effect. Figure
2 shows the percentage increase in per capita transfers around this threshold (which stands at
about 10%).17
[Figure 2 about here]
2.4 Fiscal consolidation and bailouts
During the years of the Great Recession, Spanish public finances went through deeply troubled
times. The revenue shocks described above affected all tiers of government, leading to general-
ized debt increases (see Lago Peñas and Solé-Ollé, 2016, for a detailed description). Moreover,
the process of fiscal consolidation following these shocks was slow, it not being until 2013 or
2014 that substantial cuts were made in sub-national public spending. However, some regional
and local government were ousted from credit markets much earlier (see again Lago Peñas and
Solé-Ollé, 2016). This suggests that during these years the central government and regional and
provincial governments (at least those that faced fewest financial problems) played an impor-
tant role in helping consolidate local budgets.
First, following the complaints made by the municipalities regarding the possible impact of
their having to pay a refund (i.e., negative grants that had to be paid back to the central gov-
ernment), and which arose after the clearing of the revenue-sharing grants of 2008 and 2009
(as well as those of 2010 and 2011), the central government extended the number of years over
which the refund could be paid. First, the period was extended from two to five years, an option
made available to all municipalities, irrespective of their financial situation. Second, the period
17Table A1 in the Appendix shows the pre and post reform jumps in the per capita amount at the 5 thousand
population threshold (and the difference between them), both for the total grant and for the different formula
variables.
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was extended to ten years for municipalities in financial trouble (although informal contacts
with local managers suggest that, in practice, this facility was available to all municipalities).
Given these characteristics, we believe this loan can be qualified as a form of implicit bailout.
Note, first, that no interest has to be paid, which is quite remarkable if we take into considera-
tion that by this time many municipalities had been excluded from the credit markets. While
there is no legal provision stating that these loans are not going to be repaid, the refund has
been delayed considerably, and so just what might happen to this debt when payment falls due
is unclear. Second, regional and provincial governments used funds from earmarked programs
for tax relief purposes and even created new grant programs for the same purpose. Likewise,
this constitutes yet another type of implicit bailout used to help local governments in financial
difficulties. These types of implicit bailout measures can be aggregated into a single measure.
Figure 3 below shows the evolution of revenue-sharing vs. implicit bailouts over the whole pe-
riod, indicating that implicit bailouts through grants increased following the slump in revenue-
sharing.18
[Figure 3 about here]
While the revenue-sharing grant (in blue) fell as the crisis unfolded, the overall amount re-
mained stable, as other grants (in red) were used to top them up. In the next section, we explain
how a causal relationship can be established between these two elements.
3 Empirical analysis
3.1 Conceptual framework
The purpose of this paper is to analyze how Spanish municipalities adjusted their budgets dur-
ing the Great Depression (2008-2012) in response to the shock that hit the tax-sharing grant. In
particular, we are interested in comparing the respective roles of local adjustment, on the one
hand, and implicit bailouts provided by higher tiers of government, on the other.
We define ∇Gi as the revenue-sharing shock experienced by municipality i , that is, the drop
in revenue-sharing transfers between the peak of the boom years (i.e., 2006 and 2007) and the
average transfers during the crisis (i.e., 2008-2012). As explained in Section 2, the way in which
the revenue-sharing grant is implemented means that the timing of the shock in terms of en-
titlement differs from the timing of the shock in terms of outlays. The shock to entitlements
occurred during 2008-09, while the shock to outlays was delayed until 2010-11. These effects
are illustrated in Figure 4 below. The graph shows how entitlements began to drop in 2008 and
continued to fall in 2009, while outlays did not fall until 2010. By the end of the period, both
entitlements and outlays had returned to their previous levels.
[Figure 4 about here]
18Please refer to Section 3.3 for a detailed description of how these variables are calculated.
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We define spending cuts (∇Ei ) and tax increases (∆Ti ) in the same way, and ∆Li (= ∇Ei +
∆Ti ) is the local (own) adjustment to the shock. Finally, we define ∆Bi as the average amount
of bailout-funds received. In the empirical specifications, we decompose B into the different
parts originating from the different tiers of government, B central , B reg ional and Bprovincial .
The first of these includes other grants from the central government (defined as total grants
received less G) and implicit bail-outs through delayed repayments in the case of a negative
difference between ‘cash-advance’ and the final amount of the grant. For the other two tiers
of government, we measure the discretionary grants provided to the municipalities. As the
residual, ∆DEFi is the average increase in the primary deficit.
By the budget identity, we have:
∇Gi =∆Li +∆Bi +∆DEFi (1)
and the average response to the tax-sharing shock can be estimated as:
∆Li =αL+βL ·∇Gi +uLi (2a)
∆Bi =αB +βB ·∇Gi +uBi (2b)
∆DEFi =αDEF +βDEF ·∇Gi +uDEFi (2c)
Effect on the average municipality. Note that the shock, although certainly massive, was of
a transitory nature. Therefore, the optimal response of a municipality should have been to
generate a primary deficit and to let the debt level rise, thus smoothing the shock over a long
period (Jappelli and Pistaferri, 2010). If a municipality had responded in this way, we would
expect βDEF=1 and βL=0. However, for some local governments such a response might have
been impossible due to credit constraints (see, e.g., Borge and Tovmo, 2007). Although the
debt level of Spanish municipalities was not especially high on suffering the revenue-sharing
shock, the scarcity of credit that characterized the crisis period limited their ability to resort to
using this instrument.19 This being the case, we should find some degree of adjustment even
on average, i.e., we would expect 1>βDEF >0 and βL and βB >0.
High v. low debt municipalities. In line with the preceding discussion, it is also reasonable
to expect some heterogeneous effects depending on the starting level of debt. For any of the
outcomes above, represented by Γ, we have:
∆Γi =αΓ+βΓ ·∇Gi +γΓ ·∇Gi ·D0i +δΓ ·D0i + vΓi (3)
where D0i is the level of debt before the shock. A higher level of starting debt increased the
probability that the revenue-sharing shock would worsen the financial situation, making
19See Bentolila et al. (2013) for a general discussion of the effect of the credit drought in Spain during the Great
Recession.
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it difficult for the municipality to obtain more credit and increasing the likelihood of fiscal
adjustment (either local or external). This, the marginal effect of the shock on spending cuts,
tax increases, and bailouts should be increasing in initial debt.
Who is coming to the rescue? We differentiate between the implicit bailout responses pro-
vided by each of the three tiers of government (i.e., central, regional, and provincial). The
literature differentiates between bailouts made to avoid spillover effects (see Wildasin, 1997,
and Crivelli and Staal, 2006) and those issued to safeguard the basic equality of public services
across localities (see Breuillé and Vigneault, 2010, Köthenbürger, 2004 and Goodspeed, 2002).
3.2 Identification
A threat to the estimation of the above equations is the possible endogeneity of the revenue-
sharing shock. There are various sources of omitted or unobservable variables that may bias
the OLS estimates. For example, there might be some local characteristics (e.g., income shocks
and political traits) that have an influence on local budgets (i.e., spending cuts, tax or debt in-
creases) and that are also correlated with the variables used in the revenue-sharing formula
(e.g., the tax rates and tax bases used to compute the tax effort and fiscal capacity variables). It
might be feasible to control for these influences by adding a vector of covariates to the equa-
tions, but it is not clear that this will completely eliminate any potential bias.
For this reason, we use a source of exogenous variation in the revenue-sharing shock. We
exploit the fact that the revenue-sharing shock was stronger to the left of the 5,000-population
threshold than it was to the right. Municipalities above this threshold benefited from the 2002
reform, which increased the size of the jump at the 5,000-inhabitant threshold. This means
that, when the crisis hit, the amount of the grant received by these municipalities was further
from the minimum guaranteed grant. Hence, the size of the drop was greater.
[Figure 5 about here]
This is illustrated in Figure 5. The figure shows how the log of per capita revenue-sharing
transfers evolved for two hypothetical municipalities, one with more than 5,000 inhabitants (in
blue) and one with less than 5,000 inhabitants (in red) at the time of the reform. These two mu-
nicipalities are assumed to be identical in all other respects. Note how before the reform the
municipality with more than 5,000 inhabitants already received more transfers than its coun-
terpart with a population below that threshold. Although the absolute difference between the
two municipalities increased during the period (thanks to the increase in the overall amount of
resources distributed by the revenue-sharing transfer), the log-difference stayed constant. The
reform increased the difference between the two municipalities: note how the blue line climbs
and the red line falls. The green and pink lines are the minimum guaranteed grants of each of
the two municipalities. Note that following the reform the minimum guaranteed grant is never
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binding for the larger of the two municipalities (after 2004 the red line is always above the pink).
In contrast, the minimum guaranteed grant is binding for the smaller municipality during the
first year of the implementation of the reform: note that the solid blue line (which indicates
the actual grant allocated) is above the dashed line (representing the formula amount, which is
not implemented in those years because it is lower than the minimum). Note also that the for-
mula amount falls between 2008 and 2009 by exactly the same amount in both cases; however,
the fall in the actual amount received is much greater for the larger of the two municipalities,
because the formula never drops below the minimum. In contrast, the smaller of the two mu-
nicipalities obtains the minimum grant over three consecutive years (2008-2010), which means
the drop in the amount of the grant from the peak recorded in 2007 is much smaller.
In line with these trends, we can write the revenue-sharing shock as a function of a dummy
variable coded one if the population of the municipality at the time of the reform had more
than 5,000 inhabitants:
∇Gi =µG +ηG ·d(popi ≥ 5000)+εi (4)
This is used as the first-stage equation, and we can find the reduced form by substituting this
equation in those above (which is the one we estimate here) to obtain:
∆Γi =piΓ+ρΓ ·d(popi ≥ 5000)+ςi (5)
Note that by comparing the results of Equations (5) and (4) we obtain an idea of the com-
position of the adjustment process. For instance, the effect of a cut of 100 euros in the
revenue-sharing transfer on the amount of bailouts is simply the ratio of the two estimated
coefficients, which alternatively can be obtained by estimating equation (5) by 2SLS using the
d(popi ≥ 5000) as an instrument. The identifying assumption behind this strategy is that both
treated and control municipalities where on parallel trends before the treatment. The treat-
ment is defined as having a population greater than 5,000 inhabitants at the time of the reform.
Unfortunately, good quality data for the outcomes of interest are only available after 2002, so
we cannot formally test this assumption. For this reason we have opted to follow Nannicini,
Grembi, and Troiano (2016) and estimate a ‘difference-in-discontinuities’ model instead of us-
ing first differences directly. With this aim, we add a polynomial of population to the above
equation. We apply a local linear regression function, as suggested by Gelman and Imbens
(2014), to estimate the boundary points of four different functions of our outcome variable on
Pi t to the left and the right of the 5,000- inhabitant threshold and before and after the onset of
the Great Recession: 20
Γi ,t = δ0+δ1P∗i t +Si (γ0+γ1P∗i t )+Ct [α1P∗i t +Si (β0+β1P∗i t )]+ tt +εi t (6)
20For reasons of clarity, we omit the superscript Γ when indicating the outcome variable from hereon.
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As in Nannicini, Grembi, and Troiano (2016), Si = d(popi ≥ 5000) is a dummy for municipali-
ties above the 5,000 population threshold (the defining treatment) andCt is an indicator of the
crisis period. P∗i t is the normalized population size, i.e., Pi t−5000. Our model includes a full set
of time fixed effects. Therefore, we can omit the baseline effect of Ct as this is a linear combi-
nation of the year effects. We cluster standard errors at the observational level. The identifying
assumption in this case is that municipalities just below and just above the threshold were on
parallel trends prior to the treatment. We are also unable to test this assumption. However, we
are confident that the evolution of municipalities of roughly the same size is more similar than
that of municipalities in population brackets below and above the 5,000 threshold (which range
from zero to 4,999 inhabitants and from 5,000 to 20,000). The ‘difference-in-discontinuities’
strategy is especially helpful when other policies also change at this same threshold. In our
case, we know that Spanish municipalities above the 5,000-inhabitant threshold have more
spending responsibilities, higher maximum tax rates, and larger council sizes, than municipal-
ities below this threshold (see Foremny, Solé-Ollé, and Jofre-Monseny, 2015). We also know
that they always obtain more revenue-sharing resources. Note, however, that all these influ-
ences were already present before the 2002 reform, which means that in practice they will be
captured by the base-period coefficient γ0. This coefficient does not have any causal interpre-
tation (being a mixture of all the effects of all the aforementioned policies). The parameter of
interest is β0 which captures the effect of the municipalities subject to treatment in the crisis
period.
To estimate heterogeneous responses across municipalities we allow for interactions with
the starting level of debt D0i . In this case the model becomes
Γi = δ0+δ1P∗i t +Si (γ0+γ1P∗i t )+Ct [α1P∗i t +Si (β0+β1P∗i t )] (7)
+D0i [pi1+βD0 (Ct ·Si )+ tt +εi t
and the two coefficients of interest are β0 as the baseline effect and βD0 for the interacted term.
3.3 Data and sample
We use data for the entire period 2006-2012 to study the effects of the shock to the formula
grant on various budget categories: current spending, tax revenues (including revenues from
taxes and user charges), as well as formula and discretionary grants.21 The data are provided by
the Ministry of Finance (Ministerio de Hacienda y Administraciones Públicas). Data on resident
population and other demographic controls are provided by the National Institute of Statistics
and several other sources.22 All budget variables are expressed in per capita terms and in logs.
21We focus on the period until 2012, because the constitutional reform of that year changed the regulations
regarding access to credit, deficits, and introduced a spending rule. This however, should be analyzed once suffi-
cient post-reform years are available to provide reliable estimations.
22The data on public spending and revenues presented missing values for about 2% of the sample. To keep the
panel balanced, we linearly interpolated these observations and dummified them in all specifications. Our results
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We logged the variables so that the negative revenue-shock did not just reflect the mechanical
effect of municipalities with higher per capita grants at the peak of the boom recording greater
losses in absolute terms simply because the total amount of funds dropped. The variation in
our instrument is not just attributable to this effect (recall Figure 5): it also derives from the fact
that the municipalities that benefited most from the 2002 reform were the ones that received
the largest minimum guaranteed grant, thus they had more to lose in the event of a crisis. The
use of logs, however, has an associated cost: the interpretation of the size of the coefficients is
less intuitive. For this reason, when interpreting the results we transform the coefficients into
euros by evaluating the effect on the median value of the budget variables involved.
We use a sample of all the municipalities with a population between 3,000 and 9,000 in
2004. The reason we restrict the sample in this way is because of the existence of other policy-
changing thresholds at populations of 2,000 and 10,000. Table 1 provides summary statistics
for this sample. The table provides information for the entire period in panel A, but also for the
boom and bust period separately in panels B and C. Data on taxes (T ) and current expendi-
tures (E) are directly taken from the the budgets. As for B , we use data on the grants provided
by each level of government. For the central level, we subtract the formula based transfer from
this value. We adjust the amount of the formula transfer in period t for the delayed repayments
of already paid ‘cash-advance’ in t-2 to capture the effect of implicit bail-outs.23
[Table 1 about here]
Moreover, we further restrict our sample for two additional reasons. First, we remove all the
municipalities that jumped in either direction across the threshold between 2004 and 2007 (50
observations). We do so to adhere to our philosophy of the ‘difference-in-discontinuities’ strat-
egy, which uses the exogenous variation generated by the interaction between the effect of the
reform at the threshold and the cyclical evolution of tax collections. Note that municipalities
jumping across the threshold receive a permanently higher or lower grant, independently of the
effects of the reform or the cycle. Moreover, when a municipality jumps, other policies (besides
the transfer) also change. This means that keeping these municipalities in our sample would
contaminate our instrument with influences that cannot be considered as being uncorrelated
to local budgetary policies. After excluding these municipalities, our sample comprises 1,147
annual observations. Second, we conduct a ‘donut’ estimation and eliminate observations in
a small range of the threshold (see Barreca et al., 2011, for a justification, and Sanz, 2015, for
an application to Spanish municipalities).24 After applying the ‘donut’ we fit a local regression
to each side of the 5,000 threshold on the optimal bandwidth, which is estimated using the
bandwidth selector proposed by Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014).
[Figure 6 about here]
are, however, robust to excluding these observations.
23i.e., B central is defined as total grants less formula grants corrected by the difference (G f −cash advance)t−2.
24We are able to demonstrate that our results are robust to the size of the ‘donut’.
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There are two reasons for doing this. First, we need to deal with the possibility that some
municipalities might have deliberately manipulated their population figures in order to be el-
igible for higher grants. According to the McCrary (2008) test shown in the left-hand graph in
Figure 6, there does not appear to be a statistically significant discontinuity in the density at
the threshold. However, the fact that earlier studies report clear evidence of manipulation dur-
ing earlier periods (Foremny, Solé-Ollé, and Jofre-Monseny, 2015) points to the need to use the
‘donut’ estimator. Second, we need to deal with the possible effects of excluding the munic-
ipalities that jumped across the threshold, since this generates a marked discontinuity and a
density hole close to the left of the threshold. This is clearly not the effect of any manipulation,
but the mechanical result of the application of our definition of treated and control munici-
palities. However, if ‘jumpers’ differ from ‘non-jumpers’, the characteristics of the treated and
control municipalities might not be balanced at the threshold and, more importantly for our
purposes, they might not be on parallel paths. As mentioned above, we are not able to test this
assumption, so the use of the ‘donut’ estimation is also a prudent safeguard in this case. In-
tuitively, what our estimation approach does by combining the ‘difference-in-discontinuities’
method with the ‘donut’ estimation is to define the treated and control municipalities as those
that are closest to the ‘donut’ (i.e., if the ‘donut’ is 200, those with 5,200 and 4,800 inhabitants).
While this estimator requires our making an extrapolation (after all, it is not the same as es-
timating the effect only at the 5,000 threshold), we are confident that this procedure is more
reliable than that of ‘difference-in-differences’: the municipalities close to the ‘donut’ are more
likely to be on parallel trends than the municipalities across the whole sample.
4 Results
Effects on the revenue-sharing grant, ∇G . The first stage of our identification approach in-
volves an estimation of the evolution of grants ∇G around the threshold. Table 2 presents the
results of β0 for two different grant indicators: Go (outlays), in Panel A, and G f (entitlements),
in Panel B.
[Table 2 about here]
This table confirms the correct application of our identification approach as β0 proves to be
highly significant independent of the bandwidth chosen and the donut applied. The point es-
timate for ln(Go) is about -7% (i.e., -0.066) and confirms the expected exogenous cut in formula
transfers in this period. The effect of ln(G f ) is similar in magnitude and significance. We have
chosen Model 4 as our preferred estimation and we use the selected bandwidth of 992 with
a donut of 100 in all further estimations.25 This estimate represents a reduction of about 10
25Note that the selection of the donut does not change our results. We gradually increase the excluded obser-
vations from 0 to 200 (i.e., between 4,800 and 5,200) inhabitants and the results remain stable. Furthermore, we
apply the bandwidth selected for Go to the estimation of G f and vice versa. Again, our results are robust to both
of these modifications.
16
euros in per capita values, given that the average local grant prior to the crisis was 160 euros
per capita. Indeed, using per-capita grants in levels as the dependent variable gives a point
estimate of β0=-12.24 (std. err. 3.78).
[Figures 7 and 8 about here]
Figures 7 and 8 illustrate our estimates. In Figure 8(a), we depict all our results and show
the pre-crisis (boom) periods in blue and the crisis period in red. The way in which the grant
functioned is made evident in this graph, as the huge positive windfall during the boom years
diminishes during the crisis until, due to the minimum guaranteed transfer, the effect is almost
the same. The parameter of interest β0 is, however, the difference between the two discontinu-
ities in the two periods. This is illustrated in Figure 8(b). The point estimate corresponds to the
jump in the lines at the threshold in this figure and represents our difference-in-discontinuities
estimate of -.066. Figure 8 proceeds analogously forG f .
Local adjustment to the shock, ∆L. As pointed out above, there are two possible policy
responses to this exogenous shock. First, local governments can react themselves by adjusting
their expenditure and/or revenue. Table 3 shows the results for ∆L and its components.
[Table 3 about here]
These results basically indicate that local budgets do not react. In the first two columns,
we first examine the effects on ∆L and then on expenditure, in Models (3) and (4), and on
revenue in Models (5) and (6) as its sub-components. Models (2), (4), and (6) include the
interaction term βD0 to test whether or not the effects depend on the pre-existing level of
debt. However, all coefficients on L and its components are close to zero and statistically not
significant, indicating no reaction of the local budgets. The same is true for the interaction
term in all specifications. From this exercise we can conclude that local governments did not
respond and that they made no adjustments to their budgets on either the revenue or on the
expenditure sides. Similarly, note that we record no effects even in the case of the heavily
indebted municipalities.
Effects on bail-outs, ∆B . The failure of local current budgets to respond suggests that other
policies must have affected municipal public finances during the crisis. In other words, if no
own-adjustments were implemented, bail-outs in the form of additional funds can be expected
to have played a role. We investigate this in Table 4.
[Table 4 about here]
In Models (1) and (2) we re-estimate the baseline first stage but interact it with the debt level,
as in the analysis of local adjustments above. First, we observe unchanged coefficients of β0,
confirming the baseline effect found previously. In the last row, we report the coefficients of the
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interacted termsβD0 . The interaction terms for both variables prove to be insignificant. This is a
relevant finding as it indicates that the cut in grants is independent of the financial situation of
the local governments. Any significant effect here would have implied that the formula could
not have been implemented in a stringent way.
In Models (3) to (10) we examine additional funds given by the variation in B . Overall, we do
not observe any increases in bail-out funds for those municipalities hit by the negative shock,
asβ0 is insignificant in all models. Even when we split B into its sub-components, based on the
tier of government that provides them, the average effect does not differ statistically from zero.
However, our findings are quite distinct for the interaction term βD0 . The estimations of
Model (4) provide evidence that indebted municipalities actually received bailouts as the inter-
action term for funds received from regional and provincial grants gains in significance. This
indicates that, although no funds were distributed in a regular fashion to the municipalities
affected by the cut in the revenue-sharing grant, those with substantial budgetary problems
received additional help. However, this funding did not originate from central government,
as a breakdown into the different sub-components originating from the central, regional, and
provincial tiers reveals that no extra funds were distributed by the central government (c.f.
Model (6) in Table 4). The results presented in columns 7-10 suggest that other sub-national
governments were offsetting the loss of money from the revenue-sharing arrangement.26
To estimate the magnitude of these effects, we compute the average additional funds for a
value of D equal to its 75th percentile (corresponding to about half a standard deviation, which
is relatively large for this variable). Note that the reduction in revenue-sharing grants does not
vary with the level of debt, as indicated by the interaction terms in Models (1) and (2), and that
the reduction corresponds to a loss of 10.8 euros. Regional governments, however, seem to be
the tier of government absorbing the shock. They provide an additional 9.5 euros per capita
at that debt level. In addition, the provinces provide a further 2.5 euros per capita at that level
of debt. Thus, it seems that at high levels of debt, regional and provincial bailouts are able
to absorb the whole shock. These results imply that a shock of 100 euros triggers 127 euros
in bailouts, however, it is true that the effect is imprecisely estimated, with 95% confidence
bands being equal to 28 and 226 euros. Note, however, that the effect could be even greater
for very high levels of debt due to potential non-linearities.27 In any case, our results suggest
that other sub-national sectors assumed responsibility for those local governments that found
themselves in trouble, and partially used this opportunity to offset their existing debt levels.
However, this effect can only be confirmed for relatively high values of outstanding debt at the
beginning of the crisis, meaning that this was a policy targeted at particularly troubled local
jurisdictions.
26The interaction is implemented using the difference in debt in 2008 from the average debt of all the munici-
palities in our sample. The mean of this variable in the bandwidth selected for estimation is .016 with a standard
error of .27.
27We do not present these numbers as it is difficult to extrapolate the predictions at some distance from the
middle of the distribution, given also that we do not allow for the possibility of non-linearities in the response.
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5 Conclusion
This paper reports new evidence as to how federations react to a negative revenue shock at
the local level. The novelty of this paper lies in the fact that we analyze the reaction of all the
actors involved, i.e., central government as well as the sub-national tiers of the administra-
tion. Indeed, our results point to the particular relevance of the latter, since both regional and
provincial tiers are found to play a crucial role.
We identify an exogenous shock resulting from a drop in the revenue-sharing grants at the
central level, but we show that the municipalities did not adjust their spending or taxation
levels accordingly. This points either to the complete absence of consolidation of local budgets
or to the fact that higher tiers of government stepped in to address the situation. Both scenarios
are supported by our results. First, on average, municipalities simply allowed their debt levels
to grow and absorbed the shock. However, in the case of the most indebted municipalities, a
substantial share of the shock was absorbed by regional and provincial discretionary grants.
Our results suggest that the central government played no part whatsoever in the rescue of
troubled municipalities. The lack of involvement might be due to the fact that indeed wanted
to show commitment to a no bail-out policy and to impose hard-budget constraints. Anec-
dotal evidence shows that specific measures adopted by the central government rather relied
on loans to avoid the use of transfers. On the contrary, we show that it was the other sub-
national tiers of government that bailed out the local governments using transfers for which
the shock was especially burdensome (i.e., those that already suffered from high debt levels).
This finding is relevant for several reasons. First, even though central government might enact
a policy characterized by hard budget constraints and expose local jurisdictions to the cyclical
fluctuations of tax revenues, other players appear to soften these budget constraints. Thus, any
revenue-sharing system implemented from the central level needs to take into account the fact
that other channels exist for mitigating negative shocks in order to reduce poor ex-ante fiscal
behavior.
However, various steps are still required to complete our analysis of this transitory shock.
Further research will analyze whether or not the bailouts were driven by political motives (see
Goodspeed, 2002; Piolatto and Sas, 2016). To do so, in the next step in our research we propose
analyzing the political constellation between local and higher tier governments. In particular,
alignment between local and regional governments might play a role as some regional govern-
ments received loans and transfers themselves during the same period. In addition, it might be
interesting to analyze specific loan programs undertaken by the central government.
19
References
Abbott, Andrew and Philip Jones. 2012. “Intergovernmental transfers and procyclical public
spending.” Economics Letters 115 (3):447–451.
———. 2013. “Procyclical government spending: a public choice analysis.” Public Choice
154 (3):243–258.
Ahrend, Rudiger, Marta Curto-Grau, and Camila Vammalle. 2013. “Passing the Buck? Cen-
tral and Sub-national Governments in Times of Fiscal Stress.” OECD Regional Development
Working Papers 2013/5, OECD Publishing.
Barreca, Alan I., Melanie Guldi, Jason M. Lindo, and Glen R. Waddell. 2011. “Saving Babies? Re-
visiting the effect of very low birth weight classification.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics
126 (4):2117–2123.
Bentolila, Samuel, Marcel Jansen, Gabriel Jiménez, and Sonia Ruano. 2013. “When Credit Dries
Up: Job Losses in the Great Recession.” IZA Discussion Papers 7807, Institute for the Study
of Labor (IZA).
Besfamille, Martin and Ben Lockwood. 2008. “Bailouts In Federations: Is A Hard Budget Con-
straint Always Best?” International Economic Review 49 (2):577–593.
Blöchliger, Hansjörg and Oliver Petzold. 2009. “Taxes or Grants: What Revenue Source for Sub-
Central Governments?” OECD Economics Department Working Papers 706, OECD Publish-
ing.
Bordignon, Massimo and Gilberto Turati. 2009. “Bailing out expectations and public health
expenditure.” Journal of Health Economics 28 (2):305–321.
Borge, Lars-Erik and Per Tovmo. 2007. “Myopic or constrained by balanced-budget-rules? The
intertemporal spending behavior of Norwegian local governments.” Working Paper Series
8807, Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology.
Breuillé, Marie-Laure and Marianne Vigneault. 2010. “Overlapping soft budget constraints.”
Journal of Urban Economics 67 (3):259–269.
Buettner, Thiess. 2009. “The contribution of equalization transfers to fiscal adjustment: Em-
pirical results for German municipalities and a US-German comparison.” Journal of Com-
parative Economics 37 (3):417–431.
Buettner, Thiess and David E. Wildasin. 2006. “The dynamics of municipal fiscal adjustment.”
Journal of Public Economics 90 (6-7):1115–1132.
Calonico, Sebastian, Matias D. Cattaneo, and Rocio Titiunik. 2014. “Robust Nonparametric
Confidence Intervals for Regression-Discontinuity Designs.” Econometrica 82 (6):2295–2326.
20
Carlino, Gerald A. and Robert P. Inman. 2015. “Fiscal stimulus in economic unions: what role
for states?” NBER Working Paper 21680, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Cascio, Elizabeth U., Nora Gordon, and Sarah Reber. 2013. “Local Responses to Federal Grants:
Evidence from the Introduction of Title I in the South.” American Economic Journal: Eco-
nomic Policy 5 (3):126–59.
Crivelli, Ernesto and Klaas Staal. 2006. “Size and Soft Budget Constraints.” CESifo Working
Paper Series 1858, CESifo Group Munich.
Dahlberg, Matz, Eva Mörk, Jørn Rattsø, and Hanna Ågren. 2008. “Using a discontinuous grant
rule to identify the effect of grants on local taxes and spending.” Journal of Public Economics
92 (12):2320–2335.
Dahlberg, Matz and Juergen von Hagen. 2004. “Swedish Local Government: Is there a Bailout
Problem?” In Fiscal Federalism in Unitary States, edited by Per Molander, ZEI studies in
European Economics and Law, chap. 3. Kluwer, 47–76.
Dietrichson, Jens and Lina Maria Ellegård. 2015. “Assist or desist? Conditional bailouts and
fiscal discipline in local governments.” European Journal of Political Economy 38 (C):153–
168.
Fink, Alexander and Thomas Stratmann. 2011. “Institutionalized Bailouts and Fiscal Policy:
Consequences of Soft Budget Constraints.” Kyklos 64 (3):366–395.
Foremny, Dirk, Albert Solé-Ollé, and Jordi Jofre-Monseny. 2015. “‘Hold that Ghost‘: Using
Notches to Identify Manipulation of Population-Based Grants.” Working paper, I.E.B.
Gelman, Andrew and Guido Imbens. 2014. “Why High-order Polynomials Should not be Used
in Regression Discontinuity Designs.” NBER Working Papers 20405, National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research, Inc.
Goodspeed, Timothy J. 2002. “Bailouts in a Federation.” International Tax and Public Finance
9 (4):409–421.
Gordon, Nora. 2004. “Do federal grants boost school spending? Evidence from Title I.” Journal
of Public Economics 88 (9-10):1771–1792.
Inman, Robert P. 2001. “Transfers and Bailouts: Institutions for Enforcing Local Fiscal Disci-
pline.” Constitutional Political Economy 12 (2):141–160.
Jappelli, Tullio and Luigi Pistaferri. 2010. “The Consumption Response to Income Changes.”
Annual Review of Economics 2 (1):479–506.
21
Knight, Brian. 2002. “Endogenous Federal Grants and Crowd-out of State Government Spend-
ing: Theory and Evidence from the Federal Highway Aid Program.” American Economic Re-
view 92 (1):71–92.
Kornai, J. 1979. “Resource-Constrained versus Demand-Constrained Systems.” Econometrica
47 (4):801–19.
Köthenbürger, Marko. 2004. “Tax competition in a fiscal union with decentralized leadership.”
Journal of Urban Economics 55 (3):498 – 513.
Lago Peñas, Santiago and Albert Solé-Ollé. 2016. “Multi-level finance and governance in Spain:
the impact of the Euro crisis.” In Multi-level Finance and the Euro Crisis: Causes and Effects,
edited by Massimo Bordignon Ehtisham Ahmad and Giorgio Brosio. Edward Elgar Publishing
Ltd.
Litschig, Stephan and Kevin M. Morrison. 2013. “The Impact of Intergovernmental Transfers
on Education Outcomes and Poverty Reduction.” American Economic Journal: Applied Eco-
nomics 5 (4):206–40.
Lundqvist, Heléne, Matz Dahlberg, and Eva Mörk. 2014. “Stimulating Local Public Employ-
ment: Do General Grants Work?” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 6 (1):167–92.
Martínez-Vázquez, J. and Bob Searle, editors. 2007. Designing intergovernmental equalization
transfers with imperfect data: concepts, practices, and lessons. Springer.
McCrary, Justin. 2008. “Manipulation of the running variable in the regression discontinuity
design: A density test.” Journal of Econometrics 142 (2):698–714.
Nannicini, Tommso, Veronica Grembi, and Ugo Troiano. 2016. “Do Fiscal Rules Matter?” Amer-
ican Economic Journal: Applied Economic forthcoming.
OECD. 2014. Making decentralization work. Fiscal Federalism Network. OECD.
Pettersson-Lidbom, Per. 2010. “Dynamic Commitment and the Soft Budget Constraint: An
Empirical Test.” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 2 (3):154–79.
Piolatto, Amedeo and Wiliam Sas. 2016. “A soft spot for bailouts: Regional affiliation in a re-
gional government.” Mimeo.
Rodden, Jonathan A., Gunnar S. Eskeland, and Jannie Litvack. 2003. Fiscal Decentralization
and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints. The MIT Press.
Sanz, Carlos. 2015. “Direct Democracy and Government Size: Evidence from Spain.”
Solé-Ollé, Albert and Pilar Sorribas-Navarro. 2012. “The dynamic adjustment of local govern-
ment budgets: does Spain behave differently?” Applied Economics 44 (25):3203–3213.
22
Solé-Ollé, Albert. 2010. “Intergovernmental transfers to local governments n Spain: an assess-
ment of their virtues and perils.” In General grants vs. earmarked grants: theory and practice,
edited by J. Lotz. Copenhaguen, Denmark: Ministry of the Interior and Social Affairs.
———. 2013. “Regional tax autonomy in Spain: words or deeds?” In Interaction between local
expenditure responsibilities and local tax policy, Proceedings of the 2013 Copenhagen Semi-
nar, edited by J. Lotz. Copenhaguen, Denmark: Ministry of the Interior and Social Affairs.
Solé-Ollé, Albert and Núria Bosch. 2005. “On the Relationship between Authority Size and the
Costs of Providing Local Services: Lessons for the Design of Intergovernmental Transfers in
Spain.” Public Finance Review 33 (3):343–384.
Solé-Ollé, Albert and Pilar Sorribas-Navarro. 2008. “The effects of partisan alignment on the
allocation of intergovernmental transfers. Differences-in-differences estimates for Spain.”
Journal of Public Economics 92 (12):2302–2319.
Sorribas-Navarro, Pilar. 2011. “Bailouts in a fiscal federal system: Evidence from Spain.” Euro-
pean Journal of Political Economy 27 (1):154–170.
Ter-Minassian, Teresa and Annalisa Fedelino. 2010. “The Impact of the Global Crisis on Sub-
National Governments’ Finances.” Occasional paper, Bank of Italy.
Vigneault, Marianne. 2007. “Grants and soft-budget constraints.” In Intergovernmental Fiscal
Transfers: Principles and Practice, edited by Robin Boadway and Anwar Shah. World Bank.
von Hagen, Juergen. 2008. “Achieving Economic Stabilization by Sharing Risk within Coun-
tries.” In Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers, Principles and Practice, edited by Robin Boad-
way and Anwar Shah. The World Bank.
Weingast, Barry R. 2009. “Second generation fiscal federalism: The implications of fiscal incen-
tives.” Journal of Urban Economics 65 (3):279 – 293.
Wildasin, David E. 1997. “Externalities and bailouts: Hard and soft budget constraints in inter-
governmental fiscal relations.” Policy Research Working Paper Series 1843, The World Bank.
23
Graphs and tables
Figure 1: Evolution of the Tax-sharing grant: real and simulated
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Notes: blue = actual tax-sharing grant (in nominal terms). Red = simulated tax-sharing grant (= To-
tal grant keeping the pre-2002 evolution rules: maximum growth rate is GDP and minimum is price
growth). Dotted = trend line. Source: Ministerio de Hacienda (several years): “Liquidación de la Partici-
paciòn de los Municipios en los Tributos del Estado” and own calculations.
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Figure 2: Effect of the 2002 reform on the tax-sharing formula around the 5,000 population
threshold
 
Notes: Difference between the total amount of the grant received by a municipality before and after the
2002 reform. Expressed relative to the value at the left of the threshold (=1). Dots are bin averages. Lines
are local linear polynomials. Graphs for the pre and post-reform and for each of the variables included
in the formula (weighted population, fiscal effort, and inverse of fiscal capacity) are presented in Figure
A.1. Source: Ministerio de Hacienda (several years): “Liquidación de la Participaciòn de los Municipios
en los Tributos del Estado” and own calculations.
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Figure 3: Evolution of grants
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Notes: Evolution of the revenue sharing grant (in blue) and other funds (in red: discretionary grants
from all governmental levels). Source: Ministerio de Hacienda (several years): “Liquidación de la Partic-
ipaciòn de los Municipios en los Tributos del Estado” and own calculations.
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Figure 4: Evolution of entitlements and outlays
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Notes: Evolution of the final amount of the grant (blue, solid line) (entitlements, labeledG f ) and amount
of revenues obtained from this concept during each fiscal year (red, dashed line) (outlays, labeled Go).
Source: Ministerio de Hacienda (several years): “Liquidación de la Participaciòn de los Municipios en los
Tributos del Estado” and own calculations.
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Figure 5: Mechanism at the threshold
 
Notes: The figure shows how the log of per capita revenue-sharing transfers evolves for two hypothetical
municipalities with more than 5,000 inhabitants at the time of the reform (indicated by +, in blue) and
with less than 5,000 inhabitants (-, in red) at the moment of the reform. The green and pink lines are the
minimum guaranteed grants of each of the two municipalities.
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Figure 6: McCrary (2008)-density test at the 5,000 threshold
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Notes: Panel a) shows the McCrary2008-density test around 2004 population at 5,000 inhabitants before
removing those observations which passed the threshold throughout our period; Panel b) after exclud-
ing them. Dashed lines are 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 7: Difference-in-discontinuitiesGo
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Notes: Estimates according to Model (4a) of Table 2. Dashed lines indicate the limits of the applied
donut estimator of 100 inhabitants. Dots show 50-inhabitants bins. Panel a) shows estimates for both
periods, Panel b) represents the estimated coefficient for the dif-in-disc result.
Figure 8: Difference-in-discontinuitiesG f .
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Notes: Estimates according to Model (4b) of Table 2. Dashed lines indicate the limits of the applied
donut estimator of 100 inhabitants. Dots show 50-inhabitants bins. Panel a) shows estimates for both
periods, Panel b) represents the estimated coefficient for the dif-in-disc result.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Panel A: 2006-2012
Variables obs mean std. dev. min max
Go 8,028 149.7 25.8 41.7 259.5
G f 8,029 149.1 21.4 43.1 250.9
E 8,019 708.1 259.4 178.2 3318.1
T 8,019 301.7 209.6 2.5 3592.1
B central 7,862 18.7 27.5 0 368.1
B reg ional 7,908 99.5 88.9 0 1241.4
Bprovincial 7,908 21.8 38.1 0 651.0
Panel B: 2006-2007
Variables obs mean std. dev. min max
Go 2,293 159.8 17.2 41.7 247.9
G f 2,294 166.9 17.4 106.8 250.9
E 2,294 663.2 269.9 178.2 3174.3
T 2,294 294.2 221.7 2.5 3592.1
B central 2,221 6.6 18.0 0 368.1
B reg ional 2,261 83.2 80.4 0 825.4
Bprovincial 2,261 17.7 36.2 0 515.8
Panel C: 2008-2012
Variables obs mean std. dev. min max
Go 4,588 141.5 28.2 52.8 259.5
G f 4,588 139.8 19.0 43.1 215.3
E 4,583 735.4 255.1 208.5 3318.1
T 4,583 297.7 201.8 14.3 3446.4
B central 4,542 27.9 29.6 0 315.6
B reg ional 4,548 107.8 92.8 0 1241.4
Bprovincial 4,548 23.2 39.0 0 651.0
Notes: All variables are expressed in Euros per capita. Go : out-
lays; G f : entitlements; E : current expenditures; T : tax rev-
enues; B : bail out variable at the central, regional, and provin-
cial level.
31
Table 2: Effects on formula grants (∇Gi )
Dependent Panel A: ln(Go)
Variables (1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (5a) (6a)
β0 -0.071*** -0.062*** -0.079*** -0.066*** -0.044** -0.076***
(0.018) (0.022) (0.027) (0.022) (0.019) (0.025)
observations 1,883 1,701 1,463 1,756 2,421 1,505
R2 0.631 0.659 0.660 0.656 0.675 0.653
bandwidth h 975.4 861.4 796.8 989.6 1319 840.3
donut 0 25 50 100 200 100
Panel B: ln(G f )
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b) (6b)
β0 -0.079*** -0.066*** -0.062*** -0.085*** -0.051*** -0.076***
(0.020) (0.019) (0.022) (0.020) (0.015) (0.018)
observations 1,603 1,540 1,316 1,505 2,149 1,757
R2 0.638 0.644 0.642 0.639 0.651 0.642
bandwidth h 822.5 808.5 725.2 840.3 1179 796.8
donut 0 25 50 100 200 100
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Go are outlays,
G f entitlements of the formula transfer.
Table 3: Local adjustments
Dependent ln(L) ln(E) ln(T )
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
β0 -0.020 -0.022 -0.039 -0.027 -0.059 -0.048
(0.078) (0.079) (0.048) (0.048) (0.076) (0.078)
βD0 -0.028 0.048 0.020
(0.103) (0.060) (0.104)
observations 1,756 1,756 1,756 1,756 1,756 1,756
R2 0.050 0.100 0.084 0.199 0.047 0.183
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1. Bandwidth (990) and donut (100) according to Model (4a) of Table
2.
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Table 4: Bail-outs
Dependent ln(Go) ln(G f ) ln(B) ln(B
central ) ln(B reg ional ) ln(Bprovincial )
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
β0 -0.068*** -0.081*** -0.008 0.096 -0.039 0.067 0.015 0.125 -0.176 -0.018
(0.022) (0.018) (0.215) (0.196) (0.335) (0.342) (0.188) (0.180) (0.337) (0.334)
βD0 0.012 -0.025 0.594* 0.099 0.869** 0.765*
(0.031) (0.024) (0.304) (0.500) (0.351) (0.460)
observations 1,756 1,757 1,719 1,719 1,719 1,719 1,701 1,701 1,566 1,566
R2 0.664 0.657 0.108 0.118 0.495 0.501 0.039 0.047 0.013 0.059
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All models use the continuous value of outstand-
ing debt in thousands of Euros per capita in 2008 for the interaction term D . Bandwidth (990) and donut (100) according to
Model (4a) of Table 2.
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Appendix
Table A1: Tax-sharing formula (PIE) during several periods
1990-1999 2000-2003 2004 onwards
weighted population share (1) 70% 75% 75%
- weight < 5,000 inh. 1 1 1
- weight 5,000 a 10,000 inh. 1.15 1.15 1.17
- weight 10,000 a 20,000 inh. 1.15 1.15 1.17
- weight 20,000 a 50,000 inh. 1.3 1.3 1.3
- weight 50,000 a 100,000 inh. 1.4 1.4 1.4
- weight 100,000 a 500,000 inh. 1.5 1.5 –.–
- weigh >500,000 inh. 2.85 2.8 –.–
fiscal effort share (2) 25% 14% 12.5%
inverse fiscal capacity share (3) –.– –.– 12.5%
school units share (4) 5% –.– –.–
all,
eligible municipalities (5) all all less > 75.000 inh.
+ tourism
Notes: (1) Resident population x Weight. Weight increasing according to popula-
tion size. (2) Ratio between Local Tax Revenues from the three main taxes (Property.
Vehicle and Business) and Potential Local Tax Revenues (those obtained if applying
the maximum tax rates allowed by the law). (3) Inverse of Local Tax Revenues per
capita of the corresponding population bracket (before 2004) or Inverse of the ratio
of Local Tax revenues per capita on Average Local Tax revenues per capita of the
corresponding population size bracket (after 2003). (4) Number of public school
classrooms. (5) Since 2003 municipalities >75.000 inh. and Tourism municipali-
ties are funded with a share of revenues from the Income Tax. VAT and Excises on
Tobacco and Alcohol + a lump sum fund (Fondo Complementario de Financiación,
FCF). computed as the difference between PTE and tax sharing revenues in a base
year. Source: Ley Reguladora de Haciendas Locales (1988 and 2002) and own elabo-
ration.
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Figure A1: Effect of the 2002 reform of the Tax-sharing grant around the 5,000 threshold
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Notes: All variables are expressed in per capita terms and relative to the value at the left of the threshold
(=1). Dots are bin averages. Lines are local linear polynomials. (b) Post-reform=grant per capita accord-
ing to the new formula; (a) Pre-reform=grant per capita that each municipality would have obtained
with the old formula; (c) Reform=(a)-(b). Source: Ministerio de Hacienda (several years): Liquidación de
la Participación de los Municipios en los Tributos del Estado
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